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Releasing the 1040, Not so EZ 
Constitutional Ambiguities Raised by State 
Laws Mandating Tax Return Release for 
Presidential Candidates 
by MATTHEW M. RYAN* 
I. Introduction 
 In 2016, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump refused to publicly 
release his tax returns.1  Troubled by this decision, state lawmakers in at least 
twenty-five states proposed legislation requiring disclosure of a presidential 
candidate’s tax returns.2  These laws (“release laws”) according to a 
sponsoring legislator, allow “statehouses to take th[e] matter into their own 
hands and ensure that their voters have the information they need to make a 
decision as important as casting a vote for President of the United States.”3  
An opponent of such efforts dismissed the laws as “sour grapes over the 
election.”4 
 
 *  Law clerk in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; J.D. 2017, Harvard 
Law School.  All ideas, opinions, and mistakes in this paper are solely my own.  I owe much 
gratitude to Professor Laurence Tribe, Max Schulman, and Kripa Sreepada for their invaluable 
guidance and to the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their input and 
support.   
 1.  Andrew Buncombe, Donald Trump Refuses to Release Tax Returns – The First Candidate 
to do so Since 1976, THE INDEPENDENT (May 11, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/news 
/world/americas/us-elections/donald-trump-refuses-to-release-his-tax-returns-the-first-candidate-
not-to-do-so-since-1976-a7025076.html. 
 2.  Kira Lerner, More Than Half of States are Trying to Force Trump to Release His Tax 
Returns, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 6, 2017, 8:39 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/state-legislation-
trump-taxes-bd00db338546; see also Alexi McCammond, The Big Picture: The State Efforts to 
Keep Trump off the 2020 Ballot, AXIOS (June 24, 2018), https://www.axios.com/states-tax-return-
laws-presidential-2020-trump-88e84cce-7214-409d-b4c7-a24aad919bdb.html. 
 3.  Fenit Nirappil, Blue-State Lawmakers Want to Keep Trump Off 2020 Ballot Unless He 
Releases Tax Returns, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2017/01/03/blue-state-lawmakers-want-to-keep-trump-off-2020-ballot-unless-he-relea 
ses-tax-returns/.  
 4.  Id. 
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 For three years subsequent to President Trump’s decision, no state had 
passed a release law.  In New Jersey, former Governor Chris Christie vetoed 
a bill, calling it a “transparent political stunt.”5  Similarly, in California, 
former Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a law, citing constitutional concerns.6  
During this time, the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives Ways 
and Means Committee sought the tax returns through its statutory power, an 
effort now being litigated.7 
 On July 30, 2019, however, California became the first state to pass a 
release law.8  Governor Gavin Newsom argued it promotes his state’s “strong 
interest in ensuring that its voters make informed, educated choices in the 
voting booth.”9 
 Challenges to California’s law have swiftly moved to court.10  Many 
commentators have offered their opinion on the constitutionality of release 
laws,11 and a few law review articles have examined the  
 
 5.  Alexi McCammond, The Big Picture: The State Efforts to Keep Trump Off the 2020 
Ballot, AXIOS (June 24, 2018), https://www.axios.com/states-tax-return-laws-presidential-2020-
trump-88e84cce-7214-409d-b4c7-a24aad919bdb.html. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. H.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 19-cv-1974 (D.D.C. 
July 2, 2019) (The House Committee on Ways and Means filed a lawsuit on July 2, 2019, seeking 
the President’s tax returns.).   
 8.  Governor Gavin Newsom Signs SB 27: Tax Transparency Bill, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
(July 30, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/07/30/governor-gavin-newsom-signs-sb-27-tax-tra 
nsparency-bill/. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  See, e.g., Jerry Griffin v. Alex Padilla, 19-cv-1477 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019).  On 
September 19, 2019, District Judge Morrison England Jr. temporarily enjoined the California law.  
See John Myers, Federal Judge Blocks California Law to Force Disclosure of Trump’s Tax 
Returns, LA TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-19/trump-
tax-returns-federal-court-challenge-california. 
 11.  See, e.g., Vikram D. Amar, Can and Should States Mandate Tax Return Disclosure as a 
Condition for Presidential Candidates to Appear on the Ballot, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Dec. 30, 2016), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/12/30/can-states-mandate-tax-return-disclosure-condition-preside 
ntial-candidates-appear-ballot; Danielle Lang, States Can Require Financial Disclosure by 
Presidential Candidates to Safeguard Electoral Transparency, TAKE CARE (Apr. 6, 2017), https:// 
takecareblog.com/blog/states-can-require-financial-disclosure-by-presidential-candidates-to-safeg 
uard-electoral-transparency; Derek T. Muller, Don’t Use the Ballot to Get Trump’s Tax Returns, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/opinion/dont-use-the-ballot-to-
get-trumps-tax-returns.html; Laurence H. Tribe, et al., Candidates Who Won’t Disclose Taxes 
Shouldn’t Be On The Ballot, CNN (Apr. 14, 2017, 5:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/14/ 
opinions/state-laws-requiring-tax-return-disclosure-legal-tribe-painter-eisen/index.html; Governor 
Gavin Newsom Signs SB 27: Tax Transparency Bill, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/07/30/governor-gavin-newsom-signs-sb-27-tax-transparency-bill/ 
(Erwin Chemerinsky, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., and David Boies providing statements in support 
of California law’s constitutionality).  
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topic.12  But no paper has gone beyond analyzing whether the release laws 
are constitutional, and instead considered how release laws offer a chance to 
clarify consequential ambiguities in the Constitution.  This Article does just 
that. 
 More interesting than the political tussle surrounding President 
Trump’s decision to release his tax returns, release laws implicate 
significant—and complex—constitutional issues, including the definition of 
“qualification” Supreme Court case law, the right of privacy, the 
Emoluments Clauses, and the extent of state power in choosing the President.  
This Article reviews federal precedent to more clearly define what 
constitutes a qualification for political office.  It then explores the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments’ protections for a candidate running for office, and 
the corresponding need to balance the burdens of and justifications for a 
release law.  A release law raises privacy concerns unclearly settled by prior 
case law regarding the right to privacy, and it promotes novel justifications 
for states to curb presidential corruption, including implicating the 
Emoluments Clauses.  This Article concludes by investigating the state’s 
heightened role as a gatekeeper to the presidency and exploring the role of 
states as a last resort to resolve conflicts of interest. 
A. The Proposed State Laws 
 California’s release law and other states’ proposed laws differ in certain 
respects.  For clarity, this Article assumes a hypothetical release law that 
requires a presidential candidate to release her tax returns from the preceding 
five years to the respective state’s election agency.13  If a candidate does not 
have to complete a tax return under federal law because her income does not 
meet the prescribed threshold, then she is not required to release her 
 
 12.  See Eric T. Tollar, Playing the Trump Card: The Perils of Encroachment Resulting from 
Ballot Restrictions, 51 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 695 (2018) (arguing release laws are unconstitutional); 
see also Danielle Lang, Candidate Disclosure and Ballot Access Bills: Novel Questions on Voting 
and Disclosure, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 46 (2017) (addressing Term Limits’ impact on release 
laws, conducting the Celebrezze balancing test, providing suggestions for drafting the release law, 
and concluding a release law is constitutional); see also Daniel J. Hemel, Can New York Publish 
President Trump’s State Tax Returns?, 127 YALE L.J. 62 (2017) (examining whether New York 
could require release of President Trump’s state tax returns).  As of September 9, 2019, Derek T. 
Muller appears to have a forthcoming article arguing the release laws are unconstitutional titled 
“Weaponizing the Ballot.”  See Derek T. Muller, Weaponizing the Ballot (Abstract), SSRN (Sept. 
9, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3450649. 
 13.  See, e.g., Brad Hoylman, Hoylman Forces NY State Senate Vote on Trump’s Taxes, N.Y. 
STATE SENATE (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/brad-hoylma 
n/hoylman-forces-ny-state-senate-vote-trumps-taxes.  
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returns.14  If the candidate’s income does meet the threshold, then the 
election agency posts the returns publicly months before the general election, 
but redacts the candidate’s address and Social Security number.15  If a 
candidate does not comply, her name is not placed on the state’s presidential 
ballot for the general election.16 
B. What Information Tax Returns Reveal 
 Tax returns provide important information.17  Unlike financial 
disclosures, which presidential candidates must now complete,18 tax returns 
show foreign business activity and assets with losses.19  The returns also 
provide exact financial figures, rather than approximate ranges.20  
Proponents of release laws argue that tax returns are more thoroughly 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Presidential Primary Elections: Ballot Access: Hearing on S. 149 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2017 Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (report from Sen. Mike McGuire, 
Chairman, S. Governance & Fin. Comm.). 
 15.  See, e.g., S. 149, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2017), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bill 
NavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB149. 
 16.  See, e.g., Bill Would Bar Presidential Candidates From Appearing on Mass. Ballot 
Unless They Release Tax Returns, WBUR (Dec. 13, 2016, 2:12 PM), http://www.wbur.org/poli 
ticker/2016/12/13/barrett-tax-returns-legislation.  Notably, the California law prohibits placement 
on the primary election ballot.  See Presidential Tax Transparency and Accountability Act, S. 27, 
2018-2019 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml? 
bill_id=201920200SB27. 
 17.  See, e.g., Carly Fiorina, 2013 Form 1040, TAXNOTES, https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs. 
taxnotes.com/2019/C_Fiorina_2013.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); see also Mitt Romney, 2011 
Form 1040, TAXNOTES, https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2019/M_Romney_2011.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2019).  The title of this paper is not intended to imply that candidates are 
only required to provide Form 1040; tax returns released will likely constitute much more than 
Form 1040. 
 18.  5 U.S.C.A. App. 4 § 101 (2006). 
 19.  Norman Eisen & Richard W. Painter, What Trump’s Tax Returns Could Tell Us About 
His Dealings with Russia, POLITICO (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazi 
ne/story/2016/10/donald-trump-taxes-russia-214405; see also Carly Fiorina, 2013 Form 1040, 
TAXNOTES 41 (last visited Aug. 30, 2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2019/ 
C_Fiorina_2013.pdf (showing passive investments in the Netherlands).  Some experts argue the 
returns reveal very little.  Jim Zarroli & Joel Rose, What Trump’s Taxes Would Not Show About 
His Finances, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 18, 2017, 4:32 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/18/ 
524569221/what-trumps-taxes-would-not-show-about-his-finances. 
 20.  On disclosures, the ranges can be quite broad.  For instance, in 2012, Mitt Romney’s IRA 
was valued between $21 million and $102 million.  See William D. Cohan, Mitt Romney Is Worth 
$250 Million. Why so Little?, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/opinions/mitt-romney-is-worth-250-million-why-so-little/2012/10/05/64128882-0c20-11e2-
a310-2363842b7057_story.html.  The ranges also have caps, which means very large amounts may 
not be fully captured.  See Pamela Engel, TRUMP: My Financial Disclosure ‘Is The Largest in the 
History of the FEC,’ BUS. INSIDER (May 17, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-
financial-disclosure-fec-2016-5 (Trump campaign stating that “[t]his report was not designed for a 
man of Mr. Trump’s massive wealth.  For instance, they have boxes once a certain number is 
reached that simply state $50 million or more.  Many of these boxes have been checked.”). 
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reviewed by the Internal Revenue Service than disclosure forms by the 
Federal Election Commission, so filers report their taxes more accurately.21  
But lying on either type of form carries significant penalties.22  Furthermore, 
tax returns covering a number of years—as required by the release laws—
provide a more historical picture compared to disclosure forms, which reflect 
a snapshot in time—often, one or two preceding calendar years.23 
Currently, tax returns cannot be disclosed except in limited 
circumstances.24  Under 26 U.S.C. § 6103, state employees are prohibited 
from disclosing returns “in any manner.”25  The United States Secretary of 
the Treasury may only disclose the returns if the taxpayer consents to such 
disclosure.26  Illicit release results in significant criminal penalties.27 
II. The Background Case Law: 
U.S. Term Limits, Incorporated v. Thornton 
 U.S. Term Limits, Incorporated v. Thornton is the marquee case for 
analyzing the legality of a release law.28  In 1992, Arkansas amended its state 
constitution to prohibit from its ballot United States House of 
Representatives members who had served three terms and Senators who had 
served two terms.29  Such candidates could still win via write-in candidacy.30  
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 split, found Arkansas’ law unconstitutional.31 
 Prior to Term Limits, in Powell v. McCormack, the Court established 
that the Constitution prohibited Congress from adding qualifications to its 
members beyond those enumerated in the Constitution’s Qualifications 
 
 21.  Presidential Primary Elections: Ballot Access: Hearing on S. 149 Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 2017 Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (report from Sen. Mike McGuire, 
Chairman, S. Governance & Fin. Comm.). 
 22.  Compare 5 C.F.R. § 2634.701 (2019) with 26 U.S.C. § 7207 (2002). 
 23.  Norman Eisen & Richard W. Painter, What Trump’s Tax Returns Could Tell Us About 
His Dealings with Russia, POLITICO (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 
2016/10/donald-trump-taxes-russia-214405. 
 24.  See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103. 
 25.  26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(a)(2) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53); see also Church of Scientology 
v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 10 (1987). 
 26.  26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(c) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53).  A few other exceptions are 
provided for in the statute: see 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(d) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53) (allowing 
release for state tax enforcement); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(h)(2) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53) 
(allowing release for criminal law purposes). 
 27.  26 U.S.C.A. § 7213 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53) (“Any violation of this paragraph 
shall be a felony punishable by a fine in any amount not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment of not 
more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.”). 
 28.  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 29.  Id. at 784. 
 30.  Id. at 828. 
 31.  Id. at 838. 
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Clauses.32  Powell arose from the House’s refusal to sit a duly-elected 
member because he allegedly misused House funds in a prior term.33 
 Term Limits expanded to the states Powell’s prohibition against 
Congress.  Like in Powell, the Court found that the Framers intended to keep 
elections open to all candidates in order to increase democratic 
participation.34  Unlike in Powell—because state power was now at issue—
the Court examined whether states had the “reserved” power under the Tenth 
Amendment to add qualifications to obtaining public office.35  This debate—
occurring in 1995—was particularly important given the “Federalism 
Revolution,”36 and the perceived need for the Court to draw lines permitting 
states broad power while ensuring national stability.37 
 The Term Limits Court contentiously debated the states’ reserved 
power.38  Justice Stevens’s Majority Opinion and Justice Thomas’s 
Dissenting Opinion provided thorough historical analysis to bolster their 
claims.  The Majority presented many Federalist Paper quotes,39 while the 
Dissent countered with post-ratification state laws.40  In addition to wrestling 
 
 32.  Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 
(“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of Twenty-five Years, 
and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an 
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person 
Shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a 
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for 
which he shall be chosen.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, 
or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible 
to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have 
attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United 
States.”). 
 33.  Powell, 395 U.S. at 490. 
 34.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 779, 793–95 (1995) (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 540–41). 
 35.  Id. at 798. 
 36.  See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 
(2001). 
 37.  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 78, 79–80 (1995) (“Term Limits elicited a confrontation among the Justices over 
the basic structural principles of the federal union . . . .”); Leon Lazer, The Term Limits Case, 12 
TOURO L. REV. 373, 386 (1995) (quoting Professor Laurence H. Tribe saying, “[i]f the 
Constitution’s failure to nail down a given matter with absolute finality becomes an excuse for the 
states to adopt measures that will be upheld by the Supreme Court regardless of how much they 
may undermine the integrity of the nation, then the ability of the country to hold together in difficult 
times may be seriously endangered”). 
 38.  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1995) (observing that the Majority and the Dissent battled to a draw over 
textual interpretation and historical context). 
 39.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 806–08 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NOS. 52, 57 (James 
Madison)).  
 40.  Id. at 905–10 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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over the Constitution’s history, both sides scuffled over its text.  For the 
Majority, the Constitution’s enumeration of three congressional 
qualifications in the Qualifications Clauses was ample evidence that the 
Framers created an exhaustive list.41  For the Dissent, those three 
qualifications were simply a baseline that could be further expanded upon if 
a state chose to do so.42 
 Likely sensing that the Originalist and Textualist solutions provided no 
clear answer, the Majority bolstered its position with two structural 
considerations.  First, the Court looked to the fact that the people voted to 
elect their congressperson—“a fundamental principle of our representative 
democracy” that states could not obstruct.43  Second, the Court cautioned 
that state-mandated qualifications would lead to a “patchwork of state 
qualifications,” and undermine Congress’s purpose to represent all people.44 
III. What is a Qualification? 
 Term Limits established that a state cannot add qualifications for 
members of Congress beyond those enumerated in the United States 
Constitution.  Yet, the Opinion did little to define a qualification.  To be fair, 
a comprehensive definition of “qualification” is difficult to formulate 
because the Constitution contains an inherent tension.  The Elections Clauses 
permit some state regulation of federal elections.  For instance, states, in 
Article I of the Constitution, can regulate “the times, places, and manners” 
for congressional elections, and in Article II of the Constitution, states may 
regulate the “manner” of selecting their electors for the Electoral College.45  
Thus, a state can regulate the “manner” of choosing its officeholders,46 but it 
cannot add a qualification to the office.47  In wrestling with this tension, the 
Court has avoided comprehensive definitions and, instead, approached 
interpretation of state laws on a case-by-case basis.  As Justice Neil Gorsuch 
 
 41.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 805. 
 42.  Id. at 867 (“[T]hese different formulations—whether negative or affirmative—merely 
establish minimum qualifications.”).  
 43.  Id. at 819–22. 
 44.  Id. at 822. 
 45.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of Chusing 
Senators.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be 
appointed an Elector.”). 
 46.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 47.  See generally Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779; see generally Powell, 395 U.S. 486. 
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observed in a law review article advocating for congressional term limits 
prior to Term Limits, the Court “knows a qualification or manner regulation 
when it sees one.”48 
 Term Limits provided two guideposts for defining a qualification.  It is 
an obligation: (1) targeting a “class of candidates,”49 or (2) impermissibly 
“handicapping”50 or “barring”51 a candidate.  These standards offer no clear 
resolution for a release law. 
A. A Class of Candidates: “Inherent” Qualities Targeted 
 Term Limits’ reference to targeting a “class” of candidates is derived 
from Storer v. Brown, a Supreme Court decision upholding a California law 
requiring candidates to disaffiliate from a political party for one year and to 
obtain 5% of the electorate’s signatures before running as an Independent in 
an election.52  The law prohibited primary campaign losers from spoiling the 
general election for primary winners.  Term Limits summarized the Storer 
decision as allowing a state to regulate election procedures, and “not even 
arguably impos[ing] any substantive qualification [on] a class of potential 
candidates.”53 
 Yet, determining whether a law imposes a substantive qualification is 
no easy task.  “The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard 
judgments that must be made.”54  A substantive characteristic—as the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit helpfully summarized in a case 
in which it assessed a law requiring candidates to pay a filing fee in order to 
run for political office—is something “inherent in [each] candidate.”55  It is 
“involved in the constitution or essential character of something,”56 and 
“existing in something as a permanent, essential, or characteristic 
attribute.”57 
 A law review article, written by Danielle Lang, expanded on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s definition.  The Article 
 
 48.  See Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of 
the Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 341, 355 (1991). 
 49.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 832. 
 50.  Id. at 836. 
 51.  Id. at 831. 
 52.  Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
 53.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 835. 
 54.  Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of 
elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to 
accompany the democratic processes.”). 
 55.  Biener v. Calio, 361 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 56.  Merriam Webster Dictionary Online (2019), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic 
tionary/inherent. 
 57.  Oxford Dictionary (2019), https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/inherent. 
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described a law imposing a substantive qualification as excluding access to 
the ballot “based on personal characteristics—things that cannot be changed, 
at least not at the point of election.”58  Such laws differ from permissible 
“laws that ask candidates to do something any candidate could do in order to 
gain ballot access.”59  Courts should use the release laws as a chance to 
cement this definition of qualification into case law. 
 The Constitution coheres with this definition.  Whether one was born 
naturally in the United States60 is dictated by the past and cannot be changed.  
Likewise, whether one has lived thirty-five years on Earth or has been a 
United States resident for fourteen years61 is dictated by the past and cannot 
be changed at the point of election. 
 Case law also comports with the proposed definition of a substantive 
characteristic.  In Term Limits, the Court properly struck down the Arkansas 
law because a candidate could never change whether they had served three 
terms in the House or two terms in the Senate.62  Similarly, in Powell v. 
McCormack, Mr. Powell could not undo his misuse of House funds.63  Other 
imaginable laws using this Article’s definition of a substantive characteristic 
would easily be struck down, including laws limiting candidacy to veterans, 
lawyers, persons without a felony record,64 or persons with certain IQs.65  
These laws would be dictated by past action and impossible to change at the 
point of election. 
 The release laws do not target an inherent or substantive characteristic 
of candidates.  Until a candidate releases her tax returns, she will have the 
characteristic of not releasing returns.  Similarly, like the law upheld in 
Storer v. Brown, until a candidate obtains 5% of the electorate’s signatures, 
she will have the characteristic of not obtaining such signatures.66  Both such 
characteristics, however, could easily change while running for office: a 
candidate could either consent to release of their returns or obtain signatures 
 
 58.  Danielle Lang, Candidate Disclosure and Ballot Access Bills: Novel Questions on Voting 
and Disclosure, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 46, 55 (2017). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall be 
eligible to the Office of the President.”). 
 61.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“[N]either shall any person be eligible to that Office 
who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident 
within the United States.”). 
 62.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 779. 
 63.  Powell, 395 U.S. at 486. 
 64.  Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 44 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. 1950).  
 65.  Of course, laws that target protected constitutional classes such as women or racial 
minorities would also be struck down for violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause. 
 66.  Storer, 415 U.S. at 724. 
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from 5% of the electorate.  Not targeting a substantial characteristic is step 
one of passing constitutional muster.  Release law’s constitutional issues get 
murkier from here. 
IV. Burden on the Candidate 
 Under Term Limits, even if a law does not target a class of candidates, 
it is an unconstitutional qualification if it impermissibly “handicaps” or 
“bars” a candidate from running for political office.67  This language from 
Term Limits is borrowed from prior case law that assessed the burdens placed 
on a candidate under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.68  The 
Amendments protect two “overlapping” rights, forming “interwoven strands 
of liberty”: the right of the candidate to advance her political beliefs, and the 
right of voters to support candidates who share their political beliefs.69  To 
assess whether the law is an impermissible handicap or bar, courts weigh the 
burden to the candidate against the state’s relevant interest.70  This balance 
is no “litmus-paper test,” but instead, is a “matter of degree.”71  The release 
laws introduce novel burdens and justifications, with no clear resolution. 
A. Administrative Burden on the Candidate 
 Often, courts have assessed a law’s burden based on the administrative 
feasibility of compliance.  For instance, in Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court 
struck down a March filing deadline for a November election for being too 
early,72 and, in Williams v. Rhodes, it rejected a requirement to obtain 
signatures from 15% of the electorate for being too large.73  Unlike these 
 
 67.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 831–32. 
 68.  The case law bleeds the analysis for what constitutes a qualification with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment analysis.  See, e.g., Biener, 361 F.3d at 212–13 (Third Circuit framing a 
filing fee as an impermissible handicap based on “wealth” and a violation of an indigent candidate’s 
Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Equal Protection Clause); see also Storer, 415 U.S. at 728–
36 (analyzing the First and Fourteenth Amendments simultaneously with the Qualifications 
Clause).  
 69.  Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23, 30–31 (1968)).  
 70.  See id. at 789 (“A court must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . .  It then must identify 
and evaluate the interests put forward by the State to justify the burden imposed by its rule.”). 
 71.  Storer, 415 U.S. at 730; but see Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 
2000) (In dicta, the Ninth Circuit stated that the balancing test is anachronistic.  But Schaefer dealt 
with a California law requiring residency prior to winning the election, which directly conflicted 
with the U.S. Constitution’s text regarding residency once elected, so no balance was needed.  For 
cases that do not target a substantive characteristic nor directly conflict with constitutional text, the 
law must be assessed by balancing state interests against burdens to candidates.).  
 72.  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 780 (1983). 
 73.  Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
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laws, release laws are not administratively burdensome: each private citizen 
earning a threshold income must complete a tax return in order to comply 
with federal law74—independent of their decision to run for political office.75  
Therefore, the administrative burden is as simple as consenting to the release 
of already-completed tax forms. 
 In fact, Congress already requires presidential candidates to comply 
with a process more administratively burdensome than the release of 
prepared returns.  Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Congress 
mandated that all presidential candidates submit a financial disclosure 
statement.76  A candidate must report any source of income—including 
transactions, liabilities, and assets—greater than $200.77  Candidates 
complete financial disclosure forms from scratch.  Completing such forms 
can be “excessive,” as one lawyer put it, and prevent “good people from 
running for office.”78  These disclosure requirements have never been found 
unconstitutional. 
 Imposing an administrative burden is not the only way to improperly 
hinder a candidate, however.  In Shub v. Simpson, a Maryland court struck 
down a law requiring congressional candidates to swear an oath to the state 
constitution that prohibited membership to a subversive organization.79  In 
United States v. Richmond, a federal district court struck down a plea 
agreement that required a member of Congress to agree to not run for re-
election.80  Giving an oath or signing a plea bargain could be completed 
with administrative ease; taking a few minutes at most.  Nonetheless, those 
actions were impermissible because they burdened the candidate’s access 
to the ballot in other ways by prohibiting membership to an organization 
 
 74.  26 U.S.C. § 6012(a) (2018).  
 75.  See, e.g. Presidential Primary Elections: Ballot Access: Hearing on S. 149 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2017 Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (report from Sen. Mike McGuire, 
Chairman, S. Governance & Fin. Comm.) (Presumably, states would not require tax return release 
for candidates who did not complete returns because they earned below the threshold amount and 
were not required to file federal tax returns.). 
 76.  5 U.S.C.A. App. 4 § 101 (2006). 
 77.  5 U.S.C.A. App. 4 § 102 (2012); see also Richard Rubin, What a Presidential 
Candidate’s Financial Disclosures Do, and Do Not, Reveal, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2015, 7:10 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-05-15/what-a-presidential-candidate-s-
financial-disclosures-do-and-do-not-reveal. 
 78.  Marlena Baldacci, Presidential Candidates Have Long History of Releasing Tax Returns, 
CNN (July 16, 2012, 8:26 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/16/presidential-
candidates-have-long-history-of-releasing-tax-returns/ (quoting Rob Kelner, attorney at Covington 
and Burling LLP). 
 79.  76 A.2d 332, 339–40 (Md. 1950).  The Shub court did not base its holding on the First 
Amendment right to association because it was not explicitly recognized in 1950, but the right 
would almost certainly be implicated today.  Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 
449 (1958).  
 80.  550 F.Supp. 605 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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and by leveraging the criminal justice system against the candidate’s 
decision to run. 
B. Privacy Burden on the Candidate 
 With the release laws, the candidate would be burdened by what the 
returns reveal much more than by the administrative action required to 
comply.  Tax returns contain private financial information that may have no 
bearing on how a candidate would serve as President.  As one commentator 
argued, returns contain information for “prurient” interests only.81  For 
instance, during the 2012 United States presidential election, Mitt Romney 
delayed releasing his tax returns.82  Commentators suspected that Romney 
hesitated because the returns would reveal how much he donated to the 
Mormon Church, information that could be abused by voters who dislike the 
Church of Latter-Day Saints.83  Tax returns could implicate other personal 
affairs unrelated to public office such as private gifts to in-laws in financial 
straits,84 medical surgery payments,85 or business interests that could assist 
competitors.86 
 For this reason, a candidate may challenge the release laws under the 
constitutional right to informational privacy,87 offering courts an opportunity 
to clarify this undefined right.  In NASA v. Nelson, a contract employee sued 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) because the 
agency conducted a standard background check that included collecting 
information regarding employees’ recent drug use and contacting 
 
 81.  Edward Morrissey, Romney Voyeurs: Digging for Tax Return Porn, FISCAL TIMES (Jan. 
19, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2012/01/19/Romney-Voyeurs-Digging-for-
Tax-Return-Porn.   
 82.  Doug Mataconis, Should Presidential Candidates Be Expected to Release Their Tax 
Returns?, OUTSIDE the BELTWAY (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/should-
presidential-candidates-be-expected-to-release-their-tax-returns/. 
 83.  Id.; see also Mitt Romney, Tax Returns from 2011, TAXNOTES 333 http://www. 
taxhistory.org/thp/presreturns.nsf/Returns/9F81699BC7D6DE238525798F0051C35F/$file/M_Ro
mney_2011.pdf (showing a donation of $1,115,484 to The Church of Jesus Christ of  
Latter-day Saints). 
 84.  DEP’T of the TREAS., IRS, Instructions for Form 709: United States Gift (2018), https:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i709.pdf. 
 85.  DEP’T of the TREAS., IRS, Publication 502: Medical and Dental Expenses (2018), https:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf. 
 86.  See Russell v. Bd. of Plumbing Exam’rs of Cty. of Westchester, 74 F.Supp. 2d 339, 348 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (striking down a New York law that required plumbers to release tax returns in 
order to receive plumbing license). 
 87.  All ballot access laws are subjected to external constitutional provisions—such as the 
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments—although the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments are most commonly the bars.  
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references.88  In deciding for NASA, the Supreme Court assumed a 
constitutional “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,”89 but 
subjected that “interest” to a deferential balancing test, which tipped in favor 
of the government.90  Under the test, the Court ruled that the Government 
had a legitimate interest in ensuring its employees were not taking illicit 
drugs, which was more significant than the plaintiff’s privacy interest 
because the Privacy Act ensured the information collected by the 
Government would not be disseminated publicly.91  In Whalen v. Roe, nearly 
forty years before Nelson, the Court upheld a New York statute that allowed 
the state to collect personal information on all New Yorkers who were 
prescribed certain drugs.92  The Court believed such a system—used to 
combat illicit drug use—was an “orderly and rational legislative decision.”93  
In the same year as Whalen, President Richard Nixon raised a privacy 
interest trying to prevent release of his presidential papers under the post-
Watergate Presidential Records Act of 1978.94  The Court concluded that the 
papers could be made public because they dealt with presidential duties, so 
the public interest in transparency outweighed President Nixon’s privacy 
interest.95 
 The release laws go beyond the actions upheld in the NASA, Whalen, 
and Nixon triad.  First, the laws seek to publicly disseminate private matters 
protected by statute against disclosure.  In NASA and Whalen, the Court 
found it significant that privacy statutes prevented public dissemination.96  
This protection is not available with release laws.  In fact, nearly all of the 
laws’ power comes from public dissemination.97  Second, unlike Nixon’s 
presidential papers, the release laws disseminate more personal material—a 
 
 88.  562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011). 
 89.  Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) and Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. 
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977)).  
 90.  The Court’s use of “interest,” as opposed to “right,” is significant.  The Supreme Court 
has been hesitant to find a “right” to informational privacy.  Many have attempted to argue a right 
exists by combining the penumbra of the Constitution’s First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments along with seminal cases, such as: Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Olmstead 
v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497 (1961).  See, e.g., Constitutional Law, The Supreme Court 2010 Term, Leading Cases, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 172, 237 (2011). 
 91.  Nelson, 562 U.S. at 156 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)). 
 92.  429 U.S. at 591 (1977). 
 93.  Id. at 597. 
 94.  See generally Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 95.  Id. at 457–65. 
 96.  Nelson, 562 U.S. at 156 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601–02 (looking 
to state law protections against public disclosure).   
 97.  Infra at Section VII.B: “The Timing: When and How Enforcement of Release Laws 
Should Occur.” 
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candidate’s private finances.  In dicta, the Nixon Court acknowledged 
“matters concerned with family or personal finances” may have some 
constitutional protection if those papers are “unrelated to any acts done by 
[the President] in their public capacity.”98  Release laws bring this 
unanswered hypothetical to life.99 
 Courts must decide two significant issues to resolve the privacy hurdles.  
First, do presidential candidates’ reasonable expectation of privacy allow 
them to avoid public dissemination of their finances?100  Candidates certainly 
give up many privacy protections by entering the public arena,101 but it is 
unclear how much privacy presidential candidates relinquish.  For tax forms, 
reasonable expectations of privacy may be lowered because most candidates 
in recent history have voluntarily released the information.102  Second, are a 
President’s finances relevant to their role as President?  As explored later, 
tax returns may provide critical information regarding whether a President 
has conflicts of interest impacting her ability to govern.103  The release laws 
afford courts an opportunity to further clarify the parameters of the 
constitutional privacy interest104—and simultaneously address issues of 
massive importance to the Office of the President. 
 Notably, even if a constitutional privacy interest does not invalidate the 
release laws outright, courts will weigh a candidate’s privacy interest when 
conducting the balancing test under the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
“interwoven strands of liberty.”105 
 
 
 98.  Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457. 
 99.  On July 12, 2019, during an oral argument for Donald Trump, et al. v. Mazars USA, LLP 
at the D.C. Circuit, a case involving a subpoena from the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform seeking President Trump’s accounting documents, Judge Neomi Rao alluded 
to this statement in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.  See 19-5142 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
(transcript not yet available). 
 100.  Cf. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 101.  Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 102.  Karen Yourish, Clinton Released Her Taxes. Will Trump Follow This Tradition?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/05/us/elections/presiden 
tial-tax-returns.html. 
 103.  Infra at Section V: “State Justifications for Release Laws.” 
 104.  Cf. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78–79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“Financial transactions can reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and beliefs.  At 
some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of 
privacy.”); see NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 160 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (The late-
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, who was skeptical of the parameters of the constitutional right to 
privacy, argued that the Court cannot “invent a constitutional right out of whole cloth” without 
“tying it to some words of the Constitution.”).   
 105.  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787–89.  
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C. Punitive Burden for Noncompliance 
 In addition to assessing what a candidate must do to comply with a 
ballot access law, courts also factor in the punishment for noncompliance.  
Prior to Term Limits, some courts viewed state regulations as impermissible 
if they absolutely barred candidates from running for political office for 
noncompliance, but not if the laws permitted write-in or independent 
candidacies.106  In Jenness v. Fortson, the Supreme Court upheld a law that 
placed a petition deadline on third-party candidates because it offered write-
in candidacy as an alternative to inclusion on the ballot if the candidates 
failed to comply.107  Term Limits assessed the low success rate of write-in 
candidates for congressional races, and rejected it as too formalistic to serve 
as a viable alternative to ballot access.108 
 For release laws, courts need to complete similar fact-finding about a 
presidential candidate’s success of winning office without placement on the 
ballot.  A presidential candidate may be more likely to win via write-in than 
a congressional candidate.  Presidential candidates, especially of major 
political parties, would have higher name recognition.  Furthermore, 
presidential candidates may still win with faithless electors who serve in the 
Electoral College,109 whereas no such safety valve exists for congressional 
office. 
 Nonetheless, not placing a candidate’s name on the ballot is a 
significant punishment to a candidate.  Notably, it is a far greater punishment 
than that imposed by the Ethics in Government Act, where failure to submit 
a financial disclosure may lead to civil penalties at most.110  Often, candidates 
are granted extensions.111  The proposed release laws have offered no such 
 
 106.  See, e.g., Hopfmann v. Connolly, 746 F.2d 97, 103 (1st Cir. 1984) (defining qualifications 
only on whether the law fully disqualified candidates from obtaining office). 
 107.  403 U.S. 431, 440 (1971). 
 108.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 831 n.45 (1995); see also id. at 829 (determining legislative 
intent to be to disqualify a candidate from holding office even if they could run as a write-in). 
 109.  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the 
Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215 (1994); Robert W. Bennett, The Problem of 
the Faithless Elector: Trouble Aplenty Brewing Just Below the Surface in Choosing the President, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. 121 (2006). 
 110.  5 U.S.C.A. App. 4 § 104 (2007); cf. U.S. v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994); U.S. 
v. Gant, 268 F. Supp. 2d 29, 30 (D.D.C. 2003).  
 111.  Richard Rubin, What a Presidential Candidate’s Financial Disclosures Do, and Do Not, 
Reveal, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/ 
articles/ 2015-05-15/what-a-presidential-candidate-s-financial-disclosures-do-and-do-not-reveal; 
Dave Levinthal (@davelevinthal), TWITTER (April 27, 2016, 6:24 AM) https://twitter.com/ 
davelevinthal /status/725677061084446720 (E-mail from Brad C. Deutsch, Lead Counsel of Bernie 
Sanders Campaign, to Tracey Ligon, Federal Election Commission, requesting 45-day extension 
of deadline for filing Senator Sanders’ personal financial disclosure report.). 
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leniency, requiring political candidates to release tax returns by a certain date 
or be excluded from the ballot.112 
V. State Justifications for Release Laws 
 The release law’s justifications will be weighed against its burdens.  
Thus far, proponents of release laws have articulated broad social interests 
at stake, including educating voters, ensuring public confidence in the 
political system, and retaining honest officials.113  These justifications echo 
the interests promoted by the Ethics in Government Act, which “w[as] 
designed to increase public confidence in the federal government, 
demonstrate the integrity of government officials, deter conflicts of interest, 
deter unscrupulous persons from entering public service, and enhance the 
ability of the citizenry to judge the performance of public officials.”114 
 Because release laws will reveal more intimate details and punish more 
harshly than current disclosure laws in the Ethics in Government Act, the 
release laws need to more clearly particularize the interests at stake.  Release 
laws, at root, seek to notify the electorate about potential conflicts of interest 
a candidate may have.  For instance, it can inform the public as to the 
reasoning behind a candidate’s policy position if the candidate owns 
extensive real estate and opposes closing interest deductions.115 
 These conflict of interest justifications implicate constitutional 
provisions with little case law: the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments 
Clauses.  The Domestic Emoluments Clause forbids the President from 
accepting money—and other things of value—from state governments, 
while allowing for just compensation from the federal government.116  The 
 
 112.  See, e.g., Presidential Tax Transparency and Accountability Act, S. 27, 2018-2019 Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920 
200SB27.  
 113.  See, e.g., Mitchell Zuckoff, Why We Ask to See Candidates’ Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/opinion/why-we-ask-to-see-candidates-tax-
returns.html?_r=0 (“The American people need to know if their president is a crook.”); see also 
Gregory Krieg, From Tweets to the Streets: Nationwide Anti-Trump ‘Tax Day’ Marches Came 
Together on Social Media, CNN (Apr. 14, 2017, 3:16 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/14/ 
politics/trump-tax-day-march-protests/ (“This is about transparency, ethics, and the basic function 
of democracy.”); Governor Gavin Newsom Signs SB 27: Tax Transparency Bill,  STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA (July 31, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/07/30/governor-gavin-newsom-signs-
sb-27-tax-transparency-bill/. 
 114.  See U.S v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-170, at 21–
22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4237–38). 
 115.  See Alan Rappeport, Democrats See Opening in Tax Overhaul Fight: Trump’s Own 
Deductions, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/ 
democrats-see-opening-in-tax-overhaul-fight-trumps-own-deductions.html. 
 116.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (the President is prohibited from receiving “any other 
Emolument from the United States, or any of them”).  
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Foreign Emoluments Clause forbids the President from accepting things of 
value from foreign governments, unless Congress consents.117  The Clauses 
were relatively unexamined in constitutional law for many decades, but 
nonetheless, they exist to prevent “external influence”118 over and 
“corruption”119 of federal officials.  The Framers feared that, without these 
Clauses, other governments might curry favor with United States’ federal 
officeholders, which would undermine the republic.120  Release of tax returns 
may reveal a candidate’s financial entanglements with other sovereigns.  
Without this knowledge, a President could violate a constitutional provision 
with impunity.  The Emoluments Clauses, therefore, offer states a 
constitutional hook to challenge conflicts of interest.  And yet, courts have 
never had occasion until recently to understand the reach of these clauses 
and what they regulate.121  Release laws provide a vehicle to flesh out these 
provisions. 
A. How State Justifications Cohere with Case Law 
 The interests proffered for release laws move beyond typical 
justifications for state regulation.  Primarily, courts have found constitutional 
laws that target Election Day processes.122  Term Limits acknowledged laws 
that sought to avoid voter confusion and lessen ballot overcrowding on 
Election Day.123  For instance, Term Limits cited Munro v. Socialist Workers 
Party, a case in which a Socialist Workers Party candidate challenged a 
Washington statute that required minority-party candidates to receive 1% of 
the vote in the primary election to appear on the general election ballot.124  
The Court upheld the law, agreeing with the state’s desire to avoid voter 
 
 117.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the 
United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, 
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State”). 
 118.  David Cole, Trump is Violating the Constitution, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 23, 
2017), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/23/donald-trump-is-violating-the-constitution/ 
#fn-1 (citing 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 389 
(1987)).  
 119.  Id. (citing 3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 327 
(1987)).  
 120.  See generally Norman L. Eisen, et al., The Emoluments Clause: It’s Text, Meaning, and 
Application to Donald J. Trump, BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/the-emoluments-clause-its-text-meaning-and-application-to-donald-j-trump/.  
 121.  See, e.g., Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Rejects Government’s Request to Halt Emoluments 
Suit Against Trump, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/polit 
ics/trump-emoluments-lawsuit.html. 
 122.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 834. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  479 U.S 189 (1986). 
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confusion that may arise from an Election Day ballot with too many 
candidates.125 
 In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Supreme Court struck down a March 
filing deadline for independent candidates as prohibitively early given that 
many campaign changes could occur between March and the November 
election, but nonetheless, it hinted at a state interest beyond Election Day 
processes to “foster[] informed and educated expressions of the popular will 
in a general election.”126  Anderson’s justification for voter education could 
be expanded to justify the release laws.  In Anderson, the Court wanted to 
provide voters with enough time to become familiar with candidates so that 
voters recognized the options available to them on the ballot.127  Release laws 
go beyond Anderson: seeking to educate the electorate about the candidates’ 
specific finances, and not just the candidates’ names.  But Anderson’s 
justification could be the opening thread of precedent for states to justify 
release laws. 
 In addition to the Anderson ruling, the Ninth Circuit, in Joyner v. 
Mofford, upheld a state law that sought to prevent abuse of office before and 
after an election.128  Joyner reviewed an Arizona statute preventing state 
officials from running for federal office unless they were serving their final 
year in their elected position.129  The court upheld the law, acknowledging 
that Arizona had an interest in ensuring state officials would not be corrupted 
by donations for their federal candidacy.130  The court worried a losing 
candidate of a federal election could provide favors to federal campaign 
donors from her state office.131  The court upheld the Arizona law, finding it 
primarily regulated Arizona officeholders, and tangentially regulated federal 
candidates.132  Unlike the law in Joyner, release laws do not primarily 
regulate state officials—an inherent power of state government.  
Nonetheless, both the law in Joyner and release laws share a justification in 
ending corruption, and, as will be explored now, states may have a special 




 125.  Id. at 196. 
 126.  460 U.S. 780, 796 (1983). 
 127.  Id. at 796–97. 
 128.  706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 129.  Id. at 1525.  
 130.  Id. at 1532. 
 131.  Id. at 1532 n.10 (speculating that a Board of Supervisor may receive donations from 
persons who contribute knowing they will be rewarded with zoning decisions if the candidate is to 
lose her federal race). 
 132.  Id. at 1531.   
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VI. States as Gatekeepers 
 States may have a stronger claim regulating access to the presidency 
than access to a congressional seat.  Per the Constitution, states are a 
“gatekeeper” deciding who may occupy the White House. 
 Term Limits wrongfully overlooked how broadly states may regulate 
presidential elections.  In Term Limits, despite addressing a law only 
targeting congressional candidacies, the Majority offhandedly noted that 
states retain the same limited powers in presidential elections as in 
congressional elections.133  It may be true—as Term Limits mentioned—that 
states have no greater “reserved powers” emanating from the Tenth 
Amendment for presidential elections than congressional elections.134  But 
textually, via the Electoral College, states have been delegated much greater 
power for presidential elections. 
 Surprisingly, the breadth of power is unsettled.  Three decades before 
Term Limits, Justice Potter Stewart argued the states had very broad 
discretion in establishing qualifications because of the powers delegated to 
them in Article II.135  Stewart’s argument has not been properly settled.  This 
Article will explore the inherent uncertainty of the Electoral College that 
leads to a clash between the Constitution’s text and Term Limits’ structural 
analysis—and the need for courts to resolve this dispute in order to assess 
the constitutionality of release laws. 
A. Textual Delegation 
1. How Much Power Has Been Given? 
 The Constitution’s text contains three notable differences in state power 
between Article I for congressional elections and Article II for presidential 
elections: the textual interpretation of “manner,” the scope of federal 
oversight, and the delegation to different entities.136 
 
 133.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 803–04 (quoting 1 Story § 627) (“Representatives and Senators 
are as much officers of the entire Union as is the President.  States thus ‘have just as much right, 
and no more, to prescribe new qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president . . . 
It is no original prerogative of state power to appoint a representative, a senator, or president for 
the union.’”). 
 134.  Id.; see also supra at Section II: “The Background Case Law: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton.” 
 135.  Williams, 393 U.S. at 48–51 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (finding that a state can set 
qualifications so long as the law does not violate the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, or Twenty-Fourth 
Amendments). 
 136.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of chusing 
[sic] Senators.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
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 As explained earlier, ballot access cases wrestle over the definition of 
“manner”—as it determines how broadly states may regulate elections.137  In 
Article I, “manner” is cabined by “times” and “places.”138  Regulating the 
“time” and “place” of an election is strictly an administrative matter related 
to an election procedure.  Under the canon of construction noscitur a sociis—
advising that a word in a list must be read in light of its corresponding 
words139—it is correct to read “manner” in conjunction with “time” and 
“place,” and thus, to permit narrow regulations of Election Day processes in 
Article I.140  In Article II, however, “manner” sits alone.141  On its own, 
“manner” carries a broad meaning: “a way in which a thing is done or 
happens.”142  It must be given greater force than its more cabined use in 
Article I.143 
 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be 
appointed an Elector.”). 
 137.  Supra at Section III.A: “A Class of Candidates: Inherent Qualities Targeted”; see, e.g., 
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 832 (1995) (addressing petitioner’s interpretation of “manner” within U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1); The Founders debated how broadly “manner” should be read, with some 
believing it was given broad import.  See, e.g., 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE 
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 49–50 (J. Elliot ed., 1836) (Massachusetts 
ratifying convention debating the breadth of “manner”); see id. at 326–29 (New York ratifying 
convention debating the breadth of “manner”). 
 138.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of Chusing 
Senators.”) (emphasis added)). 
 139.  See U.S. v. Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085–86 (2015) (interpreting “tangible object” to be 
limited to objects used to record and preserve information—and not to include a fish—because the 
phrase came at the end of a list alongside “record” and “document”). 
 140.  See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 511–12 (2001) (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 
U.S. 355, 366 (1932)) (“[M]anner . . . encompasses matters like ‘notices, registration, supervision 
of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud, supervision of voting, protection of voters, 
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, 
and making and publication of election returns.”); see also supra at Section V.A: “How the State 
Justifications Cohere with Case Law” (discussing state justifications pertaining to Election Day).  
 141.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”).   
 142.  Oxford Dictionary (2019), https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/manner. 
 143.  Cf. Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting U.S. v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 
722 (5th Cir. 1972)) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute 
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”); cf. Akhil R. Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999); see generally Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and 
Structure Seriously: Reflection on Free-form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 1223 (1995). 
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 Furthermore, Article I provides a congressional veto of any state 
regulation.144  James Madison wanted to empower the federal government to 
check state governments.  As he put it: 
 
The policy of referring the appointment of the House of 
Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures of 
the States, supposes that the result will be somewhat 
influenced by the mode, This view of the question seems to 
decide that the Legislatures of the States ought not to have 
the [uncontrolled] right of regulating the times places & 
manner of holding elections.  These were words of great 
latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that 
might be made of the discretionary power.145 
 
 Article II has no such veto power.146  The incongruence in federal 
oversight demonstrates that states have been delegated a different amount of 
power in Article II compared to Article I.  It is unclear how far the Article II 
power stretches. 
2. To Whom Has the Power Been Delegated? 
 Most importantly, the Constitution delegates the power to choose the 
President to the state legislatures and the power to choose Congressmen to 
the people.  Article I provides that, “[t]he House of Representatives shall be 
composed of Members chosen every second year by the People of the several 
States.”147  Likewise, in the Seventeenth Amendment, “[t]he Senate of the 
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by 
the people thereof.”148  On the other hand, in Article II, “[e]ach State shall 
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of 
Electors” and the electors then choose the President.149  In choosing the 
President, shockingly, the people need not be involved necessarily.150 
 
 144.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“[T]he Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations.”). 
 145.  2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 240 (1911), 
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1786/0544-02_Bk.pdf.  
 146.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 147.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 148.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis added). 
 149.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 150.  Since the mid-1800s, all states let their people choose the President, but the Constitution 
does not mandate such a system.  See AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 
152–56 (2005). 
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 Term Limits relied on “the people” directly choosing their 
congressmen.151  As the Court summarized, “the Framers, in perhaps their 
most important contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly 
responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over the people, and 
chosen directly, not by States, but by the people.”152  Furthermore, the Term 
Limits Court looked to the history of choosing senators and observed 
senators used to be chosen by “the Legislature thereof,”153 but now are 
chosen by direct election because of the Seventeenth Amendment.154  As the 
Court conceded, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, state legislatures 
maintained a greater “express delegation of power” in choosing senators.155  
Despite these observations, the Majority did not consider its implications for 
Article II, which still grants the power to the state legislatures.  It is unclear, 
therefore, how Term Limits applies to the Qualifications Clauses’ exclusivity 
when Article II—and not Article I—is at issue. 
3. How Has the Power Been Used? 
 State legislatures have exercised greater delegated power in presidential 
elections throughout our history.  In 1892, in McPherson v. Blacker, the 
Court acknowledged “plenary authority” for states to choose the process by 
which electoral votes would be given.156  In doing so, it observed that the 
state legislatures retained absolute power—including directly choosing who 
received the electoral votes—in the first presidential election.157  This 
continued for many more elections.158  Based on this historical practice, as 
well as the Constitution’s textual delegation, the Court concluded that Article 
 
 151.  Supra at Section II: “The Background Case Law: US Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton” 
(arguing that the Majority relied on the structural argument that people directly choose 
representatives to reach its conclusion). 
 152.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 821 (emphasis added). 
 153.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 154.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 821. 
 155.  Id. at 804 n.16. 
 156.  McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) (“The [C]onstitution does not provide that 
the appointment of electors shall be by popular vote, nor that the electors shall be voted for upon a 
general ticket, nor that the majority of those who exercise the elective franchise can alone choose 
the electors.  It recognizes that the people act through their representatives in the legislature, and 
leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method of effecting the object.”) (emphasis 
added); see also Burroughs v. U.S., 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (granting plenary power to choosing the 
manner of appointment of electors under U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1). 
 157.  McPherson, 146 U.S. at 8; see also Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its 
Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 195, 199 (2004) (“What is most striking about the limited 
[Founding] debate was the dominance of one position—a distrust of the “people” to elect the 
President.”). 
 158.  McPherson, 146 U.S. at 8–9.  
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II “convey[s] the broadest power of determination” to the states.159  Bush v. 
Gore echoed McPherson’s reading, with all sides in Bush acknowledging the 
federal government must take state’s legislative election schemes “as they 
come.”160 
B. The Constitution’s Text and History Conflict with Term Limits’ 
Focus on Uniformity 
 Yet, despite this textual and historical support giving broad power to 
states in choosing the President,161 such an outcome clashes with the 
structural analysis from Term Limits.  This clash arises from an internal 
tension in the Constitution: it has separated who chooses the President from 
whom the President represents.162  The President is chosen by 50 separate 
sovereigns, but represents all Americans at once. 
 This incongruence invokes Term Limits’ concern about the 
fragmentation of election laws.163  In Term Limits, the Court feared disunity 
of campaign laws would hurt the representation of all people.164  Arguably, 
a “patchwork”165 of laws would be even more worrisome in choosing the 
President than choosing Congressmen.  It is one thing for the State of 
Arkansas to limit who can become an Arkansas Senator; it is quite another 
for Arkansas to limit who becomes President—or more accurately, for 
Arkansas to limit who wins its six electoral votes, and thus impact who 
becomes President.  The negative externalities from one state’s laws are 
amplified when choosing one position that governs all fifty states.166  As 
 
 159.  Id. at 13. 
 160.  531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 148 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that state constitutional provisions regulate the state legislature as well); see 
also id. at 113 (Justice Rehnquist arguing that a federal question is raised if the state departs 
significantly from its legislative process.); see also Richard L. Hasen, How States Could Force 
Trump to Release His Tax Returns, POLITICO.com (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.politico.com/ 
magazine/story/2017/03/donald-trump-tax-returns-release-214950 (noting that Bush v. Gore’s 
focus on state power in electing the president bolster release laws).  
 161.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, cl. 4 (In Article II, there are a few limits to state power 
in the Electoral College, including how many electors each state receives, who may be an elector, 
and when the electors must vote.). 
 162.  Cf. Heather Lardy, The Constitutional Limits of Democratic Choice: US Term Limits Inc. 
v. Thornton, 25 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 376, 391 (1996) (analyzing the political theory for electing 
congressmen). 
 163.  See, e.g., Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 803 (“Representatives and Senators are as much 
officers of the entire Union as is the President.”) (emphasis added). 
 164.  Id. at 822. 
 165.  Id. at 780. 
 166.  Danielle Lang argues that relying on state power to uphold release laws would hurt 
democracy.  See Danielle Lang, Candidate Disclosure and Ballot Access Bills: Novel Questions on 
Voting and Disclosure, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 46, 53 (2017) (“By relying on state plenary 
authority over presidential electors to justify the disclosure law, advocates would be opening a 
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noted in Anderson v. Celebrezze, “in the context of the presidential election, 
state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest . . . 
[f]or the President and the Vice President of the United States are the only 
elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation.”167  Justice 
Thomas, despite generally arguing for broad state powers in Term Limits, 
also addressed increased negative externalities for presidential elections and 
concluded Arkansas cannot set qualifications for the President.168 
Notably, the negative externalities may be lessened with the enactment 
of release laws.  If one state releases a candidate’s returns, the information 
could then be disseminated to all fifty states.  Therefore, even if a state 
requires a different amount of information be released than a neighboring 
state, the net result will be national uniformity because all voters will 
ultimately have access to the same information.169  Nonetheless, the release 
laws serving as a barrier to the presidential ballot—as opposed to their effect 
in releasing information—maintains the uniformity concerns articulated in 
Term Limits. 
The Fourteenth Amendment also serves as a catalyst for uniformity.  
The Electoral College does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
“one person, one vote” rule,170 but adding qualifications may violate other 
Fourteenth Amendment principles.  McPherson’s observation that states 
have plenary power—made in 1892 during the post-Reconstruction 
expansion of states’ rights—narrowly read the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
“not . . . radically chang[ing] the whole theory of the relations of the state 
and federal governments to each other.”171  Such a reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is inaccurate today.172 
 
‘Pandora’s box,’ in which states could interfere with the democratic process by choosing how the 
state’s presidential electors will be selected based on something altogether different than the 
popular vote in the state.  For those hoping to improve our democratic system through transparency, 
the risks of this approach are not worth the reward.”) (citations omitted).  
 167.  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 794–95 (footnote omitted). 
 168.  Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 861 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Even though the Arkansas 
Legislature enjoys the reserved power to pass a minimum-wage law for Arkansas, it has no power 
to pass a minimum-wage law for Vermont.  For the same reason, Arkansas may not decree that 
only Arkansas citizens are eligible to be President of the United States; the selection of the President 
is not up to Arkansas alone, and Arkansas can no more prescribe the qualifications for that office 
than it can set the qualifications for Members of Congress from Florida.  But none of this suggests 
that Arkansas cannot set qualifications for Members of Congress from Arkansas.”). 
 169.  But see Eric T. Tollar, Playing the Trump Card: The Perils of Encroachment Resulting 
from Ballot Restrictions, 51 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 695, 717 (2018) (discussing negative spillover 
effect from one state passing a release law). 
 170.  See Sanders v. Gray, 372 U.S. 368, 380–81 (1963). 
 171.  McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 12 (1892). 
 172.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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 Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
cautions against additional qualifications.  As Justice Harlan argued, the 
Electoral College is a state institution, and as such, it must hear from all 
persons who want to support a candidate.173  Qualifications kicking a 
candidate off the presidential ballot would prevent the people from being 
heard.  But these arguments have never been cemented into Supreme Court 
case law.  Instead, states are left retaining an undefined amount of power in 
choosing the President. 
 Given the ambiguity between text, history, and structure emanating 
from the Electoral College, release laws offer a new opportunity to establish 
the power states have in choosing the President. 
VII. States as the Refuge of Last Resort 
 Even if states do not obtain absolute power in choosing the President, 
release laws expose a vacuum of curbing presidential corruption within the 
Constitution’s structure, and states can argue they are the best-positioned 
constitutional actors to fill the void.  In other words, states are the refuge of 
last resort for disclosure as a means to prevent conflicts of interest in the 
nation’s highest office.  To assess the structural gaps, this Article will 
analyze who should enforce presidential conflicts of interest as well as when 
and how enforcement should occur. 
A. The Institutional Actor: Who Should Enforce Release Laws 
 States stand guard to police presidential corruption.  To understand their 
power, it is best to start with the other constitutional actors’ weaknesses.  The 
Executive Branch cannot be expected to police the President, as that office 
serves over the entire branch.174 
 The Judiciary is also in a poor position to police presidential conflicts 
of interest.  Plaintiffs harmed by presidential corruption face significant 
hurdles in the courts.  It is difficult to establish Article III standing, especially 
when the extent of conflicts is unknown.  In fact, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently dismissed a lawsuit filed by the 
District of Columbia and Maryland against President Trump for Emoluments 
violations because the plaintiffs lacked standing.175  Even if a plaintiff could 
 
 173.  See Williams, 393 U.S. at 42 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 174.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  
 175.  In re Donald J. Trump, No. 18-2846 (4th Cir. July 10, 2019), http://www.ca4.uscourts. 
gov/opinions/182486.P.pdf.  On September 13, 2019, however, the Second Circuit found that a 
restaurant owner and restaurant organization had standing to allege President Trump violated the 
Emoluments Clauses. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, Restaurant 
Opportunities Centers United, Inc., Jill Phaneuf, and Eric Goode v. Donald J. Trump, No. 18-474 
(2d. Cir. Sept. 13, 2019). 
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establish constitutional standing, courts may cite a prudential concern 
against ruling on a “question[] of broad social import.”176  Furthermore, a 
court may rule that the Emoluments Clauses do not provide a private cause 
of action.177  Additionally, courts may invoke the political question doctrine 
by interpreting the Constitution as textually committing the policing of 
presidential conflicts of interest to Congress and not to the courts.178  
Furthermore, courts may believe there are no clear, judicially enforceable 
rules to apply for assessing whether a conflict of interest exists.179  Given 
these barriers, Article III is poorly positioned to curb corruption in the White 
House. 
 Congress, unlike the other two federal branches, is better positioned to 
police presidential conflicts of interest.  If states are able to mandate tax 
return release as a precondition for getting on the ballot, presumably, so too 
could Congress.180  Furthermore, congressional committees with tax law 
jurisdiction—particularly, the House Committee on Ways and Means and 
the Senate Committee on Finance—could request to view the returns in 
closed session, as the Ways and Means Committee has done for President 
Trump’s returns.181  
 But Congress is inhibited from policing presidential conflicts of interest 
in two ways.  First, many conflict of interest statutes do not apply to the 
 
 176.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 387 (3rd ed. 2000) 
(quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979)) (acknowledging courts 
may avoid deciding an issue, especially when “no individual rights would be vindicated”). 
 177.  In re Donald J. Trump, No. 18-2846, at *24 (4th Cir. July 10, 2019), http://www.ca4. 
uscourts.gov/opinions/182486.P.pdf (expressing skepticism that the Emoluments Clauses provide 
a cause of action). 
 178.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 366–68 (3rd ed. 2000) 
(discussing the political question doctrine generally); cf. Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) 
(ruling that the impeachment power is textually committed to Congress); see also Josh Blackman, 
Larry Tribe Calls My Emoluments Clause Analysis a ‘Linguistic Sleight of Hand’, JOSH 
BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Jan. 26, 2017), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/01/26/larry-tribe-calls-
my-emoluments-clause-analysis-a-linguistic-sleight-of-hand/ (advancing the argument that the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause is textually committed to Congress because Congress can, if it 
chooses, consent to the president receiving foreign emoluments). 
 179.  As constitutional scholars have recently focused on the Emoluments Clauses, many have 
disagreed on what precisely constitutes an “emolument,” and on the differing scope between the 
Domestic Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause.  Courts may find themselves 
ill-suited to draw such lines with complicated financial information, especially given the 
Emoluments Clauses’ dearth of case law.  See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Does the Emoluments 
Clause Lawsuit Against President Trump Stand a Chance, WASH. POST, (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/23/does-the-emoluments-
clause-lawsuit-against-president-trump-stand-a-chance/?utm_term=.4289d78ce4eb. 
 180.  See, e.g., George K. Yin, Congressional Authority to Obtain and Release Tax Returns, 
154 TAX NOTES 1013 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2927048 
(analyzing constitutionality of a congressional release law). 
 181.  26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(f)(1) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53). 
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President because of structural impediments.182  For example, laws requiring 
executive officials to divest financial holdings do not apply to the 
President;183 nor do laws forbidding other executive employees from 
receiving supplemental compensation.184  Congress cannot require such 
obligations of the President without interfering with the Separation of 
Powers.185  Second, for the congressional checks that could apply to the 
President—including a potential release law or committee subpoena—
Congress has failed to act.  Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon introduced a 
national release law, but it has not moved out of the Senate.186  Without a 
federal release law, Congress is left with subpoena and oversight of the 
President once the people have voted him into office.  The release laws offer 
a far more effective preventative measure. 
B. The Timing: When and How Enforcement Should Occur 
 A prophylactic disclosure of conflicts during the campaign is stronger 
than post-inauguration enforcement.  The two potential remedies post-
inauguration—a mandate that the President divest or face impeachment—
have severe deficiencies.  First, the Department of Justice, Office of Legal 
Counsel has advised that it is unconstitutional to require the Vice President 
to divest from his finances.187  This opinion would almost certainly apply to 
the President.  Second, impeachment faces high hurdles, and provides a stark 
remedy not clearly appropriate.  Furthermore, solutions after the people 
chose their President create further distrust amongst different political 
groups.188 
 
 182.  Of course, even though conflict of interest statutes do not apply to the President, the 
Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses still apply to the President. 
 183.  18 U.S.C.A. § 202; see also Julie Bykowicz & Mark Sherman, Why Conflict of Interest 
Rules Apply Differently to the President, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 30, 2016, 4:47 PM), http://www. 
pbs.org/newshour/rundown/conflict-interest-rules-apply-differently-president/ (“What’s a serious 
matter for a second-term congressman with a small business has no equivalent for a president with 
a multibillion-dollar empire.”). 
 184.  18 U.S.C. § 202 (2014); 18 U.S.C. § 209 (2004). 
 185.  See JACK MASKELL, MEMORANDUM: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ON 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND “ETHICS” PROVISIONS THAT MAY APPLY TO THE PRESIDENT (Nov. 
22, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/conflict.pdf. 
 186.  Editorial Board, An Antidote to Donald Trump’s Secrecy on Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/opinion/an-antidote-to-donald-trumps-secrecy-on-
taxes.html.  
 187.  LAURENCE H. SILBERMAN, MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD T. BURRESS, OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT (Aug. 28, 1974), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/082874.pdf.  
 188.  Cf. Fenit Nirappil, Blue-State Lawmakers Want to Keep Trump Off 2020 Ballot Unless 
He Releases Tax Returns, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/03/blue-state-lawmakers-want-to-keep-trump-off-2020-ballot-unl 
ess-he-releases-tax-returns/ (lawmaker calling release laws “sour grapes over the election”). 
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 Release laws, on the other hand, offer a simpler solution: Resolve the 
issue before a candidate takes office and let the conflicts be judged at the 
ballot box by the voters.  As James Madison acknowledged while opposing 
the Alien and Sedition Acts, “the right of freely examining public characters 
and measures, and of free communication thereon” is “the only effectual 
guardian of every other right.”189  Release laws build on this principle. 
VIII. Tailoring: How it All Comes Together 
 Bringing it all together, release laws offer a chance for courts to clarify 
the level of scrutiny applied to ballot access laws.  Courts have never applied 
a uniform level of scrutiny.190  Often, the level of scrutiny applied seems 
determined by whether the law targets a “substantive” characteristic or a 
fundamental right.191  Release laws do not target a substantive characteristic 
nor a fundamental right, but the privacy interests and uniformity concerns 
for electing the president make it likely courts will apply a scrutiny more 
demanding than rational basis.192 
 States need to clarify their justifications for the release laws.  
Unfortunately, with tax return release, there is a lingering problem for states: 
they do not know what is in a return until it is disclosed.  Before then, it is 
all conjecture about potential conflicts or corruption.  Nonetheless, states can 
still articulate how each portion of a return could bolster its justifications.  
States should carefully delineate what information has a legitimate 
justification.  For instance, states must justify how the release of a 
candidate’s effective tax rate or charitable deductions serve an interest 
related to a candidate’s future conduct in office, and not simply serve as 
political fodder.193 
 
 189.  James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), http://press-pubs. 
uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs24.html. 
 190.  See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992) (rejecting strict scrutiny, and instead 
applying “a more flexible standard” that “weigh[s] ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary 
to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’”) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788–89). 
 191.  See, e.g., Williams, 393 U.S. at 31 (1968) (requiring the state show a compelling interest 
to protect independent candidates); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 147 (requiring a showing of necessity for 
a filing fee law that would harm indigent candidates).  
 192.  See Louis Bernard Jack, Constitutional Aspects of Financial Disclosure under the Ethics 
in Government Act, 30 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 593–94 (1981) (arguing overbreadth analysis from the 
First Amendment context should apply in privacy analysis). 
 193.  See Editorial Board, ‘We the People’ Demand Mr. Trump Release His Tax Returns, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/opinion/we-the-people-demand-mr-
trump-release-his-tax-returns.html (“Releasing the returns would provide important insight into 
Mr. Trump’s finances and businesses.  They would reveal if he is as wealthy as he claims to be, 
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A. Slippery Slope 
 Resolving these open questions is important because a slippery slope is 
lurking.  If release laws like the one in California are found constitutional, 
states will likely propose laws requiring release of many documents, such as 
school transcripts or medical records.194  Like tax returns, these documents 
have been relevant to the electorate in recent years and contain information 
protected from public disclosure.195 
 School transcripts and medical records also flip the current political 
valence.196  In 2012, President Trump sought President Obama’s college 
applications and transcripts.197  Four years later, when running for office, he 
suggested Secretary Clinton and he release their health records.198  To avoid 
partisan politics in determining the constitutionality of laws that require 
release of information, courts will have to ensure the state’s justifications are 
properly tailored to the type of information released.  Medical information, 
for example, seems to burden a person’s privacy interest more than financial 
information, and it is unclear what constitutionally germane or illegal 
activity would be disclosed from a medical record.  Law school transcripts 
may inform the electorate how well a candidate did in constitutional law, but 
 
what his effective income tax rate is (he said during the campaign that not paying taxes meant he 
was smart) and how much he gives to charity.”); see, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Promised 




 194.  Eric T. Tollar, Playing the Trump Card: The Perils of Encroachment Resulting from 
Ballot Restrictions, 51 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 695, 726–27 (2018) (“However, obtaining tax returns 
by way of state ballot restrictions could easily open the door to perverse results . . .  We must ask 
ourselves if we are willing to transform ballot restrictions from procedural roadblocks designed to 
prove a candidate’s political viability, into proverbial crowbars used to pry loose information that 
some simply want from a candidate.  It begins with tax returns but could quickly lead to drug tests 
and medical histories. Or birth certificates.”). 
 195.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C § 552a; 26 U.S.C. § 1232g; 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.  
 196.  See, e.g., Russell Goldman, Donald ‘Bombshell’ Fails to Blow Up, ABC NEWS (Oct. 24, 
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/donald-trump-fails-drop-bombshell-offers-cash-oba 
ma/story?id=17553670 (“Donald Trump today pledged $5 million to a charity of President 
Obama’s choice, provided the president makes public his college applications and transcripts . . . .”); 
Dan Merica, Clinton Campaign Releases New Health Information, CNN, (Sept. 15, 2016, 12:55 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/14/politics/clinton-campaign-releases-new-health-informati 
on/index.html (“Hillary Clinton’s campaign released additional medical information Wednesday 
after questions about her health intensified. . . .”).  
 197.  Russell Goldman, Donald ‘Bombshell’ Fails to Blow Up, ABC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/donald-trump-fails-drop-bombshell-offers-cash-obama/stor 
y?id=17553670. 
 198.  Dan Merica, Clinton Campaign Releases New Health Information, CNN, (Sept. 15, 2016, 
12:55 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/14/politics/clinton-campaign-releases-new-health-inf 
ormation/index.html. 
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it does not seem that such information can be tailored to a more compelling 
justification to require aspiring officeholders to release their grades.  
Nonetheless, an ambitious state could argue medical reports and transcripts 
tie into the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s assurances that a President is able 
“to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”199  Like release laws, these 
questions provide no easy answers.  But they demonstrate the need for courts 
to ensure the interests at stake are tailored to the burdens—and for further 
clarity on the definition of qualification and the states’ power in regulating 
presidential elections. 
IX. Conclusion 
 On April 15, 2017, thousands of Americans marched in protest to 
demand that President Trump release his tax returns.200  Taking to the streets 
has been one of many avenues used by Americans to demand access to their 
President’s financial information.  Another avenue offered in at least 25 
states, and passed in California, requires presidential candidates to release 
their tax returns in order to be placed on the state’s presidential ballot.201  
Beyond the temporal politics, these laws invoke constitutional ambiguities, 
including the meaning of the Qualifications Clauses, the application of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments’ protection of candidates’ access to the 
ballot, the reach of the right to privacy, the significance of the Emoluments 
Clauses, the breadth of power to states to conduct presidential elections, and 
the role states have in policing federal corruption.  The release laws provide 
a vehicle to resolve urgent constitutional uncertainties that extend well 
beyond today’s political fight. 
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